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The Right to Deregulate: The CFPB’s Authority to Remove the Ability-
to-Pay Requirement as it Pertains to Payday Lenders 
 
By Ben Davisson* 
 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is facing heat from 
twenty-five states’ attorneys general for a proposal which could place 
many financially distressed consumers in an even more precarious 
position.1 The proposal is to rescind the Bureau’s rule requiring payday 
lenders to make a reasonable determination that the consumer will have 
the ability to repay the loan.2 Because payday loans typically carry a very 
high interest rate and are often used by low-income consumers to make 
ends meet until their next payday, regulation of these loans is particularly 
appropriate in order to protect this class of consumers.3 That being the 
case, the attorneys general contended in a comment letter to the CFPB that 
the proposal is inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank Act and is deeply flawed 
as a matter of law and policy.4 
The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law in 2010 in response to the Great 
Recession.5 The Act established the CFPB to “regulate the offering and 
provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal 
consumer financial laws.”6 The Act further authorized the CFPB to 
implement and enforce laws to ensure that the consumer financial 
products markets are fair, transparent, and competitive.7 While the act 
explicitly required residential mortgage lenders to make a reasonable and 
good faith determination that the consumer could repay the loan,8 it is 
silent on whether short-term lenders such as payday loan companies are 
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required to make these determinations. In 2018, the CFPB answered that 
question in the affirmative when it enacted the regulation at issue.9 
Now the question remains as to whether the CFPB can rescind its own 
rule, even if it might have a detrimental impact on consumers. This would 
hardly be the first time that the courts have been called upon to determine 
the authority of an administrative agency in relation to the powers 
delegated to it by Congress. In the seminal case on the issue, Chevron, 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United States Supreme 
Court instructed that “considerable weight” should be given to an 
administrative agency’s construction of a statutory scheme that it is 
entrusted to administer.10 It further cautioned that a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for that of an 
administrative agency so long as the agency’s interpretation is a 
reasonable one.11 
Not surprisingly, in Chevron, the Court deferred to the policy 
determinations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and held 
that its interpretation and implementation of a statutory scheme was 
reasonable and therefore immune from judicial scrutiny.12 In that case, 
Congress had amended the Clean Air Act to require states with air quality 
problems to establish a permit system to regulate “new or modified major 
stationary sources” of air pollution.13 However, Congress never 
specifically defined the term “stationary source.”14 Thus, in its regulation 
to implement the permit system, the EPA adopted its own plantwide 
definition of the term “stationary source,” meaning that so long as a plant 
as a whole does not increase total emissions, then the plant is free to install 
or modify individual pieces of equipment.15 The Court noted that, while 
the term “stationary source” had been defined in one portion of the Act as 
“any building, structure, facility, or installation,” that definition was 
expressly limited to another program under the Clean Air Act and not to 
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the permit program at issue.16 Ultimately, the Court determined that 
Congressional intent could not be determined from the reading of the 
statutory language alone.17 Turning to the legislative history and the 
purposes of the Act, the Court noted that forbidding the plantwide 
definition of “stationary source” may very well have been consistent with 
the Act’s purpose of improving air quality.18 However, the Court also 
pointed out that the plantwide definition was also consistent with the 
Act’s concern for economic growth.19 In the absence of clear statutory 
language suggesting the meaning of the term “stationary source” and 
finding that the EPA’s adoption of the plantwide definition was not 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Clean Air Act, the Court then 
rejected the respondent’s policy argument by stating that such arguments 
carry no weight when an administrative agency is interpreting and 
constructing a statutory provision so long as that construction is a 
reasonable one.20 Thus, even though the Court itself might have chosen a 
different construction of the term “stationary source,” it nonetheless 
deferred to the EPA’s construction of the term after concluding that its 
construction was reasonable.21 
Chevron provides insight into the likely fate of the current challenge to the 
CFPB. Like in Chevron, where the EPA adopted the plantwide definition of 
“stationary source” in spite of Congress expressly forbidding that 
definition in another portion of the Act,22 here, the CFPB is proposing to 
rescind the ability-to-pay requirement for payday loans despite the Dodd-
Frank Act requiring that assessment for mortgage lenders.23 Although 
here, the language of § 1639c does not explicitly limit this requirement to 
mortgage lenders at the exclusion of other types of lenders, a court would 
likely conclude that Congress was particularly concerned about the 
dangers posed by subprime mortgage loans but recognized that the 
ability-to-pay requirement’s reach as applied to other types of lenders 
should be for the CFPB to decide. Also like in Chevron, where forbidding 
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the plantwide definition of “stationary source” may have been more in 
line with the Clean Air Act’s purpose of improving air quality,24 here, 
prohibiting the CFPB from rescinding its ability-to-pay requirement may 
very well be in furtherance of the Bureau’s purpose of ensuring fair, 
transparent, and competitive consumer financial products markets.25 
However, many desperate consumers depend on payday loans and might 
otherwise be compelled to seek other more predatory and potentially 
illegal forms of lending.26 Therefore, the Bureau’s decision to loosen the 
regulation is a reasonable policy choice by a Bureau responsible for 
ensuring fair, transparent, and competitive consumer financial products 
markets.27 Once a court decides that the decision to rescind the ability-to-
pay requirement is a reasonable one, it would likely refuse to entertain 
any policy arguments that might be raised.28 Therefore, if this challenge 
finds its way to the courtroom, a court would likely defer to the CFPB’s 
decision and allow it to rescind the ability-to-pay requirement. 
The challengers to the proposal certainly have their work cut out for them. 
If the CFPB ultimately decides to go through with its proposal, consumers 
will have to be extra diligent in dealing with payday lenders in the 
absence of a government safety net. 
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